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We employ Eurobarometer micro-level data on trust in institutions, in order to explore its 
determinants, considering socio-demographic characteristics, and macroeconomic indicators. 
The main contribution of our analysis is the investigation of the potential impact of sovereign 
credit rating episodes and the adoption of bail-out programmes. We find that trust in 
institutions is substantially eroded in countries that experience downgrade episodes and 
participate in fiscal adjustment programs while it is significantly strengthened following 
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1. Introduction  
There has always been an implicit economic and social contract between institutions 
and the society they serve. Trust is fundamental for a competitive and properly functioning 
financial and political system, however its fragility and complexity means it can take time to 
be restored once damaged. Following government bailouts, political and economic scandals, 
volatile economic conditions, and a persistent recession among European Union countries 
and particularly those in the periphery (Theodoropoulou and Watt 2011), the relationship 
between government, citizens and the financial sector has entered into a vicious cycle of 
blame and anger. It would be reasonable to argue that the current situation has inevitably 
damaged the trust people have in their government and in other institutions. This is linked to 
an increasing interest in exploring the determinants of trust, particularly given that during the 
last three decades, there has been a documented tendency of trust in institutions to decline in 
the most developed-industrialized countries (e.g. Citrin & Muste, 1999; Putnam, 2000; 
Dalton, 2004; Catterberg & Moreno, 2006 etc.).  
At the same time, the questions posed regarding the European Union’s democratic 
legitimacy in its existence as a ‘regional Union of nation states’ (Schmidt, 2004) adds another 
and even more interesting dimension, that of the different ways trust is built when it comes to 
comparing the national Government with European institutions. In this context, Schmidt’s 
thesis that while the EU might be achieving democratic legitimacy based on its composite 
identity, its citizens may feel a significant democratic deficit because the Member States are 
losing their traditional legitimacy, adds a whole new perspective when considering the 
dynamics of trust towards national and EU institutions.  
According to Eurobarometer surveys, trust in the EU reached, on average, an 
unprecedented low of 31% in the spring of 2012, while trust in national governments reached 
a low of 23% in the autumn of 2013. This development brings forward the issue of growing 
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mistrust during abnormal times. Newton (2008), Kosfeld et al. (2005) and Kaltenthaler et al. 
(2010), argue that people’s distrust in institutions threatens their legitimacy and authority, 
which might ultimately lead to their abolishment by creating structural malfunctions in the 
overall system. It therefore becomes crucial to understand how and why individuals develop 
their commitment and trust in institutions.  
According to Roth (2009), the relevant literature broadly groups the notion of trust 
into three main categories: thick, interpersonal and systemic. As Roth notes a sufficient level 
of systemic or institutional trust is key in maintaining the stability of the economic system, 
otherwise the legitimate character of the market-based economy is called into question. 
Eroded levels of trust will lead to calls for more government intervention and less economic 
integration. We acknowledge the particular economic and political importance of 
systemic/institutional trust and we make it the focal point of our investigation. More 
precisely, we concentrate on trust towards national and EU-level institutions. 
We go beyond the study of individual characteristics and their effect on trust, by 
considering the larger social and institutional structures in which individual trust is rooted. 
Firstly, we attempt to shed light on the debate regarding the determinants of institutional trust 
for a number of relatively homogeneous, in terms of structure and political status, countries in 
the EU. However, we extend the existing literature by exploring the idea that tight economic 
conditions serve as an accelerating mechanism of distrust in institutions. We believe that 
these conditions are not reflected solely on the (already considered) macroeconomic variables 
that affect the business cycle but are also mirrored in changes in credit ratings and the 
participation in bailout memoranda of agreement.  
In light of the above, the present study aims at providing new evidence on the drivers 
of trust for a set of European and national institutions, namely the ECB, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the national governments across EU members. 
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Surprisingly, within an environment of increasing Euroscepticism and questionable 
democratic legitimacy, there are only a handful of empirical studies that examine the 
determinants of trust in EU institutions (e.g. Kaltenthaler, et.al. 2010; Munoz, et.al. 2011; 
Roth, 2009 & 2011, Kalbhenn and Stracca, 2015 etc.). Our ambition is to assess whether the 
decline in trust is a standard cyclical response (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011), reflects other 
non-economic related factors, or it is due to the specific character of the current financial 
downturn. The paper contributes to the rapidly expanding literature on the impact of the 
financial turmoil on trust by presenting empirical results of the financial crisis on public 
opinion vis-à-vis institutional or systemic trust, while controlling for the factors that prior 
studies have found to be important in shaping the level of trust. Within this framework, 
special attention is given to the confidence invested in: a) political and financial institutions at 
European level and b) the national government and the importance of credit rating episodes 
as well as the role of bailout memorandum agreements.  
Our findings are consistent with the suggestions of the relevant theory regarding the 
effects of socio-demographic and economic factors. We classify our results in three groups, 
individual and sociodemographic characteristics, macroeconomic and other financial 
conditions and episodes of economic nature that are not direct outcomes of economic policy. 
We believe the most interesting finding of this work to be the deterioration of trust resulting 
in towards the European institutions because of the introduction of bailout agreements whilst 
those do not seem to substantially change (the already low levels of) citizens’ trust on their 
national government.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we review the relevant empirical findings 
from previous studies on trust in the European institutions. Section 3 describes the data 
utilized and the empirical methodology applied. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and 
finally Section 5 concludes by highlighting the broader implications of our findings. 
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2. Empirical Evidence 
The majority of the existing literature examining institutional trust in the context of 
the European Union focuses on the European Central Bank, and particularly in the period 
following the beginning of the financial crisis. As anticipated, European citizens’ level of 
trust in the main financial institution of the Union, reflecting the evolution and strengthening 
of the common currency, is of particular interest among scholars. 
The importance of macroeconomic variables such as inflation levels and national 
income as well as unemployment in determining the trust on ECB following the start-up of 
the European Union and the introduction of the new currency is considered by Fischer and 
Hahn (2008) and Walti (2012). Financial distresses as well as country-level fiscal 
developments have a negative effect on building a trust relationship.  
The issue of democratic legitimacy is contextually relevant in the work of 
Kaltenthaler et.al. (2010) who ask the question as to whether the levels of distrust observed 
towards the ECB are the results of the institution’s policies or are due to the fact that citizens 
cannot control the institution. They find that Europeans distrust the European Central Bank 
because either they have no knowledge of its functions or because they believe that their 
voices (or that of their countries) cannot be heard.  
Individual characteristics and socio-demographic determinants, such as education, 
wealth, and political orientation, and their effect on people’s trust towards the ECB are 
considered by Farvaque et.al. (2011) and by Bursian and Furth (2013). Finally, Ehrmann 
et.al. (2013) use individual but also country specific variables in order to study the trust in the 
ECB during the global financial and the EU sovereign debt crisis. They conclude that the fall 
in trust levels towards the European Central Bank can be explained by pre-crisis factors such 
as the general macroeconomic deterioration, the decline in levels of trust in the other 
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European institutions in general and the severely problematic banking sector to which the 
ECB is strongly associated according to public opinion.  
A smaller number of studies have attempted to examine the determinants of trust 
towards other European institutions. The relationship between trust in national and European 
institutions has been addressed by Munoz et.al. (2011) who, although they find that in general 
there is a positive association between the confidence in national parliaments and the 
European parliament, when the performance of national institutions increases, and in 
countries with well performing and highly trusted institutions, trust in the European 
Parliament tends to weaken. Roth (2009) finds a significant fall in confidence of European 
citizens in the EU institutions (European Commission, European Parliament, ECB) when at 
the same time confidence levels in national governments, although still lower than in EU 
institutions, are rising. However, Roth et.al. (2013), having observed a significant decline for 
the periphery (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland), conclude that unemployment is a major 
factor in the trust building relationship, and deterioration in labour market conditions has a 
significant negative effect on institutional trust at both the national and the European levels. 
When economic policy is considered, Kalbhenn and Stracca (2015) show that fiscal austerity 
measures do not seem to have a significant effect on public opinion and in particular on 
institutional trust. 
3. Data 
 Empirical studies on institutional trust have shown that there is, in most cases, a link 
between a country’s macroeconomic performance and its citizens’ individual characteristics 
with institutional trust. However, there is no evidence on the potential impact of changes in 
credit ratings on trust and nor is there for the cases where a country participates in bailout/ 
memorandum agreements. With this in mind, this section presents the data utilized in the 
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analysis and provides a clear account of the measures of trust used, the rationale behind the 
selection of European and national institutions and the set of determining variables as well as 
of the relevant controls.  
3.1 Trust in Institutions  
Trust in European institutions is based on data from the Eurobarometer surveys which 
are conducted on behalf of the European Commission at least twice a year in all European 
Union (EU) member states. In particular, we combine micro data from Eurobarometer 
surveys in order to build a pooled dataset consisting of 29 cross sections, sampled semi-
annually during the time span of 2000 until the first half of 2014. With 28 countries 
constituting the European Union, 18 of them being Eurozone members, and observed for 14 
years, we obtain a total number of more than 240,000 observations.  
The survey asks participants the following question:  
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. 
For each of the following institution, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” 
There are four dependent variables capturing institutional trust, namely, trust in the 
European Central Bank (ECB), trust in the European Parliament, trust in the European 
Commission and trust in the national government.  
Participants are given the choice between three possible answers: “1, Tend to trust”, 
“2, Tend not to trust”, and “3, Do not know”. In order to have an operational and uniformed 
measurement, we recode the raw responses in the following manner. Let (𝑖𝑖), denote the type 
of institution and (𝑐𝑐), and (𝑡𝑡) the country in which the survey was conducted and time period 
respectively. Then we generate a set of new variables (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡)  that attain the following 
values: 
Trusti,c,t= �
0, if the ith type of institution at country c  in year t is not trusted





As we test for the tendency to trust or mistrust we focus only on positive and negative 
responses. As it becomes apparent the new variables retain the information embodied in the 
original responses.  
There are various reasons for the selection of the particular institutions and for our 
attempt to closely monitor citizens’ trust in them. The association of European and national 
institutions is of great importance in this study. European citizens are governed by a 
complicated multi-layered administrative system including both national and European 
institutions. Despite that, causality is not our main focus in this paper and to avoid possible 
limitations in our approach we examine both national and European institutions and explore 
the differences in people’s attitudes towards them. Previous works (e.g. Sanchez-Cuenca, 
2000;  Rohrschneider, 2002; Kritzinger, 2003; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Scheuer and van der 
Brug, 2007 etc.) have provided contradicting results regarding people’s trust in European 
institutions relative to national ones. Trust in European institutions is basically a reflection of 
citizens’ levels of trust in national institutions. However, the opposite argument is that 
increased confidence in, and satisfaction with, national institutions will impede support for 
European institutions.  
3.2 Socio-Demographic Attributes  
To address the questions stated above we use Eurobarometer surveys from 2000 to 
2014 to construct the socio-demographic profile of respondents (see Table A1 in Appendix 
A). We choose to include the variable of presence of other persons during the interview in an 
attempt to control for people’s behaviour. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) claim that people 
have the tendency to feel good about themselves when responding in a politically correct 
manner to questions relating to trust. However, in order to avoid an upward bias in the 
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number of affirmative responses, we believe that the presence of others during the interview 
forces interviewees to respond with honesty and moderation.  
Following the existing literature, we add socio-demographic characteristics such as 
marital status, education, age, and the respondent’s occupation in order to control for the 
expectations already formed by those who respond.  
The fact that people perceive the world differently over their life cycle drove 
researchers to adopt age as a proxy to capture the way young or elder people tend to trust 
(Hudson, 2006; Putnam, 2000). Young people may have less experience in dealing with 
public institutions and hence be less critical while elder people behave in the opposite way.  
Trust might increase with age as a result of a maturing process (Mishler & Rose, 2001; 
Glaeser et al., 1999; Patterson, 1999) while others report a curvilinear relationship (Brewer 
et.al., 2004; Hudson, 2006; Wollebaek & Selle, 2002). In addition, the type of a respondent’s 
occupation can be viewed as a reflection of cumulative influences, like education, 
employment, all of them leading to higher occupational status (Schoon and Cheng, 2011). As 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find, a successful professional is keen to trust more. According 
to Deary et.al., (2008), the participants’ current social class or professional status 
(professional/managerial, skilled non-manual, skilled manual, semi- or unskilled) as it is 
derived from their profession advocates that people in more managerial positions exhibit 
higher levels of trust. In addition, Gleave et al. (2011) claim that “being successful in the 
labour market is likely to promote trust because it provides people with the necessary 
resources to take risks and hence trust others.”  
Marital Status is included in an effort to clarify the mixed findings in the literature, 
ranging from higher levels of institutional trust for married respondents (Diener et.al., 2000, 
Hudson, 2006, etc.) to non-influential effects (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). 
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3.3 Macroeconomic Conditions and Financial Stress  
People’s perceptions of institutions can also be influenced by the phase of the 
economic cycle (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; Hudson, 2006). The public might hold the financial and 
political institutions accountable for high levels of unemployment and low growth. Hence, we 
add real national GDP growth (GDP Growth) and the national unemployment rate 
(Unemployment Rate) as proxies for a country’s macroeconomic conditions. Data on 
macroeconomic variables are obtained from Eurostat. Bursian and Furth (2013), in line with 
La Porta et al. (1997), report that a high level of real GDP as a proxy for national income 
might be regarded as an indicator of an economy that is well-functioning as well as of a 
certain level of efficiency associated with different economic institutions. Fischer and Hahn 
(2008) provide evidence that confidence in ECB significantly benefits from higher national 
income. 
In addition, unemployment which in turn influences attributes such as social status, is 
assumed to reflect individual perceptions of the economic system. It is expected that 
employed people tend to trust public institutions more than the unemployed or those with no 
occupation. Losing a job might lead to less confidence in the government, particularly in the 
presence of long unemployment spells, as would the failure to climb the occupational ladder 
(Hudson, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Youniss et al., 2002).  
To avoid potential endogeneity issues we decompose our macroeconomic 
determinants (GDP Growth & Unemployment rate) using the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter 
(1999) into a cyclical and a trend component. We name the business cycle component 
cycle_cf.  
However, the recent financial crisis brought to the surface factors that were not 
typically considered in trust modelling. For instance, the issue of banking sector soundness is 
such a factor, given that several systemic European banks were involved in the crisis. Thus, 
as a proxy for banking sector financial soundness we use the ratio of Non-Performing Loans 
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to Total Loans as an inverse soundness indicator. Similarly, since the financial crisis soon in 
Europe was transformed into a sovereign debt crisis, we also use Sovereign Bond Yields to 
capture sovereign financial distress (Walti, 2012). Data on financial stability are obtained 
from IMF’s Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), while yields correspond to the 10 year 
sovereign bond yield from Datastream. 
3.4 Events of Interest: Sovereign Credit Rating Episodes & Memoranda 
 
Sovereign credit rating is a complex measure capturing various country performance 
indicators. Prior to the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, the EU countries ratings’ paths 
were almost a ‘one-way bet’ with downgrades being essentially absent. However, following 
the crisis, a number of EU countries have witnessed several and, in some cases severe, 
downgrade episodes. These unprecedented events, having a real economic effect, are also 
taken into account when we try to explore the determinants of institutional trust.  
Data on sovereign credit ratings are obtained from Moody's. The ratings range from 
Aaa (highest credit quality possible) to CCC (default). Ratings of Aa3 and above are denoted 
as Prime-1, indicating high quality and very low credit risk. We follow Moody’s 
announcements regarding each country's rating for the period 2000-2014 and create two 
variables, capturing the upgrade and downgrade episodes: 
UPc,t =  �
1, if  country c  in year t is upgraded
 0, if  country c  in year t is not upgraded
�, 
 DOWNc,t  =  �
1, if country c  in year t is downgraded
 0, if country c  in year t is not downgraded
� 
where ( )c  denotes the country and ( )t  the time period.  
In the sample period there are nine countries that never experienced any change in 
their credit rating status (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
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Sweden, Czech Republic and Estonia). All other countries witnessed rating changes, and as it 
turns out most of them were downgrades, especially in countries where economic adjustment 
plans were implemented1.  
The outbreak of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 has produced a wave of bailout 
schemes for a number of Eurozone countries. These have witnessed further challenges as 
their economies have plunged into a recession, and at the same time they have been the 
subjects of an ongoing sovereign debt crisis (mainly Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain). With no intention to downplay the importance of economic variables as determinants 
of trust, we think that the search for evidence should include the role of fiscal-adjustment 
programmes (memorandums of agreement)2. The implementation of austerity policies in the 
memorandum era has drastically changed the socio-economic structure in countries where 
these reforms took and are still taking place. Greece was the first Eurozone member to come 
under intense pressure after markets lost their confidence in its economy and it was also the 
first country to turn to fellow member states and the IMF for financial assistance. Ireland and 
Portugal followed and were later joined by Cyprus in 2013. All countries had to adopt harsh 
austerity measures that were adopted as a precondition for the release of the bailout funds 
from the so-called Troika (European Union, IMF and ECB) in an environment of low 
economic growth, rising unemployment rates and signs of overall economic fragility.  
A novelty of this paper is that it makes use of an unprecedented event for Europe. We 
believe that trust in institutions is very likely to be affected in countries that followed a bail-
out plan (Greece, Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal), due to the agreed austerity measures. Based 
                                                          
1 Total Downgrade Episodes: 1: Belgium, France, UK, 2: Lithuania, Malta, 3: Croatia, Latvia, Slovak Republic, 
4: Italy, 5: Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Slovenia, 7: Cyprus, Greece. Total Upgrade Episodes: 1: Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovak Republic, 2: Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia, 4: Bulgaria 
2 Memorandum: Greece (2010), Ireland (2010), Portugal (2011), Cyprus (2013), Spain followed a financial 
assistance programme in 2012 for the recapitalisation of financial institutions 
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on this, we create a variable to capture the fact that countries were in an economic adjustment 
program (EAP) during the period under consideration: 
MEMORANDUMc,t =  �
1, if country c  in year t follows an EAP
0, if country c  in year t does not follow an EAP
� 
Where ( )c  denotes the country and ( )t  the time period.  
4. Methodology and results 
4.1 Methodology 
Trust is a set of binary variables and will be modeled by a probit model. The vector of 
covariates is populated as follows:  
(i) socio-demographic variables (SOCIO),  
(ii) Business Cycle indicators (real GDP Growth (GDP), Unemployment rate 
(UNEM)) 
(iii) financial soundness of the banking system (Non-Performing Loans (NPL)) 
(iv) sovereign financial distress (dummy of High Yield (HYIELD)) 
(v) Sovereign Credit Rating episodes (DOWN, UP)   
(vi) Participation in a bailout programme/memorandum (MEMO) 
To obtain the cyclical and trend components for GDP growth and unemployment we 
decompose the corresponding variables by employing two alternative filtering techniques, the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) and Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) filters. We define the smoothing 
parameter λ of the HP filter to be equal to 100 (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997 and Ravn and 
Uhlig, 2002, for a detailed discussion). Following Drehman et. al., (2012) and for the CF 
filter we set the minimum and maximum periods at 2 and 8 years respectively. The following 
model is thus employed, accounting also for country and year fixed effects: 
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Pr�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1� = 𝜸𝜸𝟎𝟎 + 𝜸𝜸𝟏𝟏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜸𝜸𝟐𝟐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝜸𝜸𝟑𝟑𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
+ 𝜸𝜸𝟒𝟒𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈+𝜸𝜸𝟓𝟓𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈 +  𝜸𝜸𝟔𝟔𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 + 𝜸𝜸𝟕𝟕𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 + 𝜸𝜸𝟖𝟖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
We are primarily interested in the parameters (𝜸𝜸𝟏𝟏,𝜸𝜸𝟐𝟐,𝜸𝜸𝟑𝟑,𝜸𝜸𝟒𝟒,𝜸𝜸𝟓𝟓,𝜸𝜸𝟔𝟔,𝜸𝜸𝟕𝟕𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝜸𝜸𝟖𝟖 ) which 
capture the impact, if any, of the variables of main interest. Our main priors are: 
• the propensity to trust will tend to be lower/higher for countries experiencing 
downgrade/upgrade episodes, so we expect γ5 < 0 and γ4 > 0   
• the propensity to trust will tend to be lower for countries involved in a financial 
assistance program (MEMO), so we expect   γ8 < 0.   
With respect to socio-demographic factors we expect a positive effect on trust for 
education, age, marriage and managerial occupation. Regarding the variables relating to 
macroeconomic stance, we expect a positive sign for the cyclical component of GDP and a 
negative for the one of unemployment  γ2 > 0, and γ3 < 0. A negative sign is expected for 
both NPL and HYield: γ6 & γ7 < 0.  Finally, country and year fixed effects are also estimated 
4.2 Empirical Results 
4.2.1 Baseline Results   
Table 1 reports the estimated Marginal Effects3 for each of the four institutions4. We 
present two versions of results, one including country and year fixed effects and another 
which additionally addresses clustering issues by generating standard errors clustered by 
country. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 report the results without country clustered standard errors and 
columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 with clustering. The model proves to be highly significant as indicated 
by the relevant LR tests. We start our analysis by assessing the extent to which socio-
demographic attributes play a role in understanding the variation of trust in EU & national 
                                                          
3The actual estimation results are available upon request 
4Estimated Marginal Effects across the two possible outcomes (tend to trust, tend not to trust) add up to unity. 
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institutions. These characteristics have a long-standing effect in the literature on trust 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Paxton, 
2007; Zak and Knack, 2001). We make use of determinants of trust on individual basis 
focusing on marital status, age, education, respondent’s occupation and the presence of other 
persons during the interview. All these attributes may affect the social tightness between 
individuals putting barriers to developing trust (e.g. Delhey and Newton, 2005; Leigh, 2006).   
We include the marital status as a psychological determinant of attitude formation 
which possibly captures an individual’s subjective well-being. For those who are married, the 
probability of trust significantly increases for all European institutions. When marital status 
changes to single, the tendency to trust remains positive for European institutions, though it is 
at lower levels. Marital status does not seem to have a significant effect on trust in the 
national government. 
The respondents’ occupational status provides mixed results relative to trust in the EU 
institutions, but mostly insignificant for national institutions. In particular, managers, having 
achieved systemic recognition or professional prestige, tend to trust more particularly the 
ECB and the European parliament. Manual workers show high levels of mistrust to European 
institutions whilst the unemployed consistently mistrust all institutions. In line with our 
expectations, individuals with higher level of education are more likely to trust the EU and 
national institutions. Indeed, trust levels are strongly linked to the degree of the respondents’ 
education: Those who feel that they have a good knowledge of European or national affairs -
which increases with education - are more likely to have confidence in the EU than those who 
feel they know (very) little on the subject. Besides, we expected that trust would increase 
with age however our results suggest that the probability to mistrust is common for all age 
groups in our sample, and especially for the quite vulnerable age group of 45-54. Finally, the 
presence of others during the interview increases the probability to mistrust for the European 
15 
 
institutions, but it is not relevant in the case of national institutions. Similarly to the non-
clustered standard errors, we find the similar pattern of results across all institutions. 
According to Bursian and Furth (2013), one would expect variables that are not 
related to financial institutions, like the ECB, or are outside of their control to be irrelevant to 
the trust-building process. However, if we assume that members of the general public do not 
always act rationally and cannot distinguish the real mandate of each institution, they might 
be influenced by such factors as well. Institutional accountability could be indiscriminate in 
people’s conscience.  
Regarding our macroeconomic determinants, our results show that the cyclical 
component of real GDP growth has a surprising negative or insignificant impact on trust 
across all European institutions, with the exception of the national government. More 
specifically, and in line with previous findings (e.g. Bursian and Furth, 2013; La Porta et al. 
1997), we find that an increase in real GDP growth by 1.0 percent implies a 0.03 pp increase 
in the probability of trust for the national government when   standard errors are used. This is 
consistent with similar finding by Munoz et.al. (2011) who find that when the performance of 
national institutions increases, trust in the European institutions tends to weaken. The cyclical 
component of the unemployment rate carries the expected negative sign for all EU 
institutions but does not seem to significantly affect trust in the national government (similar 
findings by Hudson, 2006; Walti, 2012), when robust standard errors are employed. 
Regarding the banking sector’s financial soundness, we find that as NPL increases, 
trust in EU and home institutions tends to be lower. Financial distress is statistically 
significant in all cases leading to lower levels of trust.  
 We expect that a downgrade episode will lead to a decline in trust. Note here that any 
development regarding the country’s solvency is monitored by the European Commission 
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and the national government and not by the ECB. The ECB is not clearly responsible for 
monitoring sovereign solvency. However, the recent crisis and frequent credit rating 
announcements by rating agencies combined with an increasing cost of borrowing, 
particularly for the most heavily affected economies, may have significantly shaped public 
perceptions about the efficiency of institutions.  
We find that downgrade episodes exert a negative impact on trust in ECB and the 
European Parliament as opposed to other institutions where there is no significant effect. A 
downgrade episode decreases the average probability of trust by 0.2 pp for the ECB and 1.1 
pp for EU Parliament when not clustering by country. When upgrade episodes occur, the 
reported results show that the national governments rip the trust benefit.  
The austerity measures of the bail-out plans have led people to reduce their trust in 
institutions across the board. For countries that have adopted these measures the probability 
of trust is significantly lower across all types of European institutions. We find a higher 
probability of deterioration to trust mainly for the ECB, the EU Commission (7 and 5.8 pp 
respectively) and for the EU Parliament (5pp). The probabilities of mistrust when clustering 
by country are even more emphatic. This is anticipated as the ECB and the European 
Commission jointly formed the bailout plans with the IMF for the Eurozone countries and 
European institutions are held accountable for the memorandums in the mostly hit 
economies. Surprisingly, the corresponding probability to trust the national government 
remains insignificant, a result perhaps suggesting that, in the public’s conscience 
responsibility for participation in a memorandum agreement lies outside the national borders.  




4.2.2 Mapping Trust across different sample subgroups   
 
We further explore how trust is distributed across selected sub-groups of the sample 
population, where essentially we calculate the probability to trust under various scenarios. 
The subgroups (scenarios) are:  
• Countries whose credit status was downgraded/upgraded.   
• Countries being/not being in a memorandum scheme.   
• Countries whose GDP growth falls below the 25th, between the 25th and the 75th 
and above the 75th percentile of the distribution (lower to higher).   
• Countries whose Unemployment rate falls below the 25th, between the 25th and 
the 75th and above the 75th percentile of the distribution (lower to higher).   
• Respondents who were employed vs. those that were unemployed.  
• Countries whose NPL volume follows a low to high spectrum, falling below the 
25th, between the 25th and the 75th and above the 75th percentile of the 
distribution. 
• Countries facing financial distress. 
• Respondents who were employed/unemployed before/after 2010.  
• Respondents who were employed/unemployed during the presence/absence of a 
memorandum. 
• Countries that were downgraded/upgraded during the presence/absence of 
memorandum. 
• Countries facing high yields (top 25% of the distribution)/ no high yield during 
the presence/absence of memorandum. 
• Countries not being/being in memorandum and were not/were downgraded and 
the respondent was employed/unemployed.  
• Countries that were not/were upgraded and the respondent was employed/ 
unemployed in the absence/presence of memorandum.  
• Countries that were not/were financially distressed and the respondent was 
employed/ unemployed in the absence/presence of memorandum.  
• Countries that were not/were financially distressed and were not/were 
downgraded/upgraded in the absence/presence of memorandum.  
18 
 
The relevant results for the mean predicted probabilities are reported in Table 2. We 
firstly compare countries that are in a bail-out plan during the examined time-period and 
those that witnessed a downgrade episode. Countries that have adopted a memorandum 
exhibit substantially lower levels of trust for all institutions with national governments 
reaching the lowest point at 30%.  
The tendency to trust the ECB is predicted with a probability of 32% for countries 
going through a fiscal stability program while for countries not following a fiscal adjustment 
program the tendency to trust carries a probability of 59%, producing a Predicted probability 
Ratio (PPR hereafter) of 1.84. This suggests that the average respondent residing in a country 
experiencing a bail-out program is 1.84 times more likely to respond that they do not trust the 
ECB.  
The PPRs for the other facets are in the range of 1.20 and 1.59 indicating that the 
likelihood of mistrust is higher in countries that have followed a bail-out plan. For countries 
that have (have not) witnessed a downgrading episode, the predicted probability to trust is 
0.45 (0.59) for the ECB, 0.51 (0.60) for the European Parliament, 0.50 (0.58) for the 
European Commission and 0.32 (0.36) for the national governments. In the same vein the 
predicted probability to trust is higher across all facets for countries that have experienced an 
uplift of their credit rating. 
For the European institutions, the probability to trust diminishes collectively while 
governments are struggling with very low probabilities regardless of the magnitude of the 
recession. A similar picture is emerging when unemployment is considered both from the 
perspective of the economy’s performance as well as of that of the individual. However, the 
disappointment is even more clearly visible in this case, as people seem to punish all 
institutions including higher levels of distrust for the already damaged national governments 
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(0.31 predicted probability in the presence of an unemployment rate that is higher than 
10.1%). 
When considering the levels of financial stability and financial distress, we see that 
the predicted probabilities for deterioration of trust across all facets are considerably higher 
for countries where the banking system faces a high ratio of non-performing loans. In 
particular, there are substantial differences in predicted probabilities for all types of 
institutions, where the probability of deterioration of trust in national governments for 
financially sound countries is at least 11 pp higher. This produces PPRs of 1.36 (Nat. Gov) 
and 1.13, 1.14 and 1.30 (EU. Com, EU Parliament and ECB respectively). A similar picture 
emerges when we compare high and low yield countries, with the PPR ranging between 1.02 
and 1.13, implying that the probability of distrust is higher for the ECB and national 
governments.                
Moving on to the comparison of bivariate scenarios across countries we introduce a 
break in 2010, the year in which Greece first agreed to enter a bailout plan with the IMF and 
the European institutions. The PPRs for all possible scenarios are higher than the unity 
implying that trust is reduced significantly across all institutions during harsh economic 
times. The tendency to trust seems to be affected by the time period and this is mainly 
reflected on national governments rather than on European institutions. When being 
employed the predicted probability to trust falls to 34% after 2010 which is even more 
emphatic (30%) for those who were unemployed in the same period. When the case of the 
presence of memorandum enters into the scenario, someone who is employed during the 
years of memorandum tends to trust less on average (30% vs. 36% in memorandum absence). 
This result is even stronger for those who were unemployed during those years decreasing the 
probability to trust to from 0.32 to 0.28 for national governments and from 0.49 to 0.24 for 
ECB. When a downgrading episode is included in the scenario, results show that if a country 
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is downgraded and at the same time follows a bail-out plan, people tend to trust less (31%) 
than in countries that were downgraded but were not in a bail-out plan (33%). The last 
scenario refers to countries with high sovereign bond yields where the probability to trust 
diminishes from 0.33 to 0.31 for national governments in memorandum presence while it  
ranges from  0.30 to 0.39 for EU institutions. 
The final triangular scenarios confirm the above. The average tendency to trust is 
significantly lower for people who are unemployed in a country that was downgraded and 
simultaneously follows an economic adjustment program. Results show that institutional trust 
is between 0.26 and 0.34 for these countries, compared to a level between 0.36 and 0.61 
(depending on the institution) for countries that were not downgraded, were not participating 
in a fiscal adjustment program and the respondent is employed. A similar picture emerges 
when we introduce two additional scenarios with high yields, downgrades and memorandum 
presence. These results emphatically suggest that under harsh economic conditions and 
especially within an environment of abnormal events the tendency to trust is significantly 
affected. The overall lowest levels of trust are recorded for national governments and the 
ECB by unemployed respondents who live in a country participating in a memorandum 
agreement and is financially challenged either by having being downgraded or by suffering 
from high sovereign bond yields. 
An interesting outcome of the above analysis is that any adverse experience leads 
individuals to the loss of a degree of trust across all institutions. However, national 
governments and the ECB who determine economic policy are more emphatically blamed. 
The attitude of people changes dramatically with respect to memorandum presence.  




Our econometric specification links trust in national and European institutions to a 
range of macroeconomic variables, sociodemographic characteristics, credit rating episodes, 
rising sovereign bond yields, financial stability and fiscal adjustment memorandum 
agreements, capturing thus several of the crisis facets. 
The recent decline in the public's trust in institutions is particularly large indicating 
that much of this decline may be attributable to the recent recession. Our results confirm that 
countries that experienced worsening macroeconomic conditions witnessed a markedly 
decline in public trust. Additionally, we attempted to shed light on the intrinsic trust building 
process as we consider, for the first time, the idea of sovereign rating episodes as well as the 
existence of mutual bail-out agreements between national governments and European 
institutions.  
Our findings reveal interesting patterns of trust and provide useful insights when it 
comes to the public’s perception, and therefore trust formation following the direct or indirect 
effects of economic policy. Our main findings are summarised below: 
- When sociodemographic attributes are concerned, improvements in social and 
occupational status seem to have a positive effect on trust in all institutions, 
particularly the European ones whilst their absence results in higher level of 
mistrust. 
- Economic and financial conditions have a direct effect on the public’s institutional 
trust with higher levels of unemployment negatively affecting trust levels towards 
European institutions whilst indicators of financial distress and deteriorating 




- The introduction of adjustment programmes as well as economic downgrades 
have a very clear negative effect on the levels of trust enjoyed by European 
institutions. However, in cases of upgrade announcements, the national 
government is the institutional entity reaping the benefit. 
The latter reveals that communication of information appears to be an issue that is 
worth further investigation. This introduces the idea of the different ways trust is built when it 
comes to comparing the national government with European institutions. Citizens’ perception 
of the role of the national government and that of EU institutions often reveals a sense of 
confusion as to the levels of shared responsibility. The direct exposure of general public to 
information communicated by national governments seems to have a greater effect on public 
opinion compared to that of European institutions, particularly as they seem to struggle to get 
a clear message to the public. Policy implications are therefore derived regarding the 
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TABLE 1  
The Probability of Tend to Trust: Marginal Effects 
Covariate 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Observations 265276 223478 277971 233580 280999 237811 268051 226343 







Pseudo R2 0.065 0.068 0.022 0.029 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Log Likelihood -168481.31 -140266.88 -176876.5 -148531.06 -179372.92 -149998.72 -171937.32 -143677.88 
Notes: (a) ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, (b) numbers in brackets denote robust 






Predicted Probability of Trust across sample subgroups  
  ECB 
National 
Government EU Parliament 
European 
Commission 
Scenarios based on a single characteristic Mean Value Mean Value Mean Value Mean Value 
Being in Memorandum/ Not being in Memorandum 0.32/0.59 0.30/0.36 0.40/0.60 0.37/0.59 
No downgrade/ Downgrade 0.59/0.45 0.36/0.32 0.60/0.51 0.58/0.50 
No upgrade/ Upgrade 0.57/0.68 0.35/0.42 0.59/0.72 0.57/0.71 
GDP growth <-0.1 (25th percentile) 0.52 0.35 0.55 0.54 
GDP growth >= -0.1 (25th percentile) or <3.6 (75th percentile) 0.57 0.35 0.59 0.57 
GDP growth >= 3.6 (75th percentile) 0.64 0.35 0.65 0.63 
Unemployment<5.9 (25th percentile) 0.64 0.41 0.61 0.59 
Unemployment>=5.9 (25th percentile) or <10.1 (75th percentile) 0.57 0.35 0.59 0.57 
Unemployment>=10.1 (75th percentile) 0.50 0.31 0.55 0.53 
Being Employed/ Unemployed 0.58/0.47 0.36/0.32 0.60/0.49 0.58/0.48 
NPL<11.19 (25th percentile) 0.64 0.41 0.62 0.60 
NPL>=11.19 (25th percentile) or <37.78 (75th percentile) 0.57 0.35 0.59 0.57 
NPL>=37.78 (75th percentile) 0.49 0.30 0.54 0.53 
No High Yield/ High Yield 0.59/0.53 0.36/0.33 0.59/0.58 0.58/0.56 
Scenarios based on two characteristics     
If Employed before 2010 0.66 0.38 0.65 0.64 
If Employed after 2010 inclusive 0.53 0.34 0.56 0.55 
If Unemployed before 2010 0.57 0.35 0.58 0.56 
If Unemployed after 2010 inclusive 0.41 0.30 0.45 0.44 
If Employed in memorandum absence/ presence 0.59/0.33 0.36/0.30 0.61/0.41 0.59/0.38 
If Unemployed in memorandum absence/ presence 0.49/0.24 0.32/0.28 0.51/0.31 0.50/0.29 
If downgraded in memorandum absence/ presence 0.48/0.35 0.33/0.31 0.54/0.43 0.52/0.40 
If upgraded in memorandum absence 0.68 0.42 0.72 0.71 
If high yielded in memorandum absence/ presence 0.55/0.30 0.33/0.31 0.60/039 0.58/0.36 
If not high yielded in memorandum absence/ presence 0.60/0.34 0.37/0.28 0.60/0.40 0.59/0.37 
Scenarios based on three characteristics 
    If not downgraded and  being employed in memorandum absence 0.60 0.36 0.61 0.60 
If  downgraded and being unemployed in memorandum presence 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.31 
If not upgraded and  being employed in memorandum absence 0.59 0.36 0.61 0.59 
If not high yielded and  being employed in memorandum absence 0.61 0.37 0.60 0.59 
If high yielded and  being unemployed in memorandum presence 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.26 
If not high yielded and  not being downgraded in memorandum absence 0.61 0.37 0.60 0.59 
If high yielded and  being downgraded in memorandum presence 0.34 0.32 0.43 0.40 
If not high yielded and  not being upgraded in memorandum absence 0.60 0.37 0.60 0.58 
Notes: Sociodemographic variables are not mentioned in the table 
 
 
